

APRIL 1974

THE NEED FOR MILITARY FORCES IN PEACETIME  
OF THE 1970's, University of Kentucky,  
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NAVY review(s) completed.

Korlesky  
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I. Understandable questioning of DOD budget

- A. Largest ever (Current \$ Outlays) despite four pressures in opposite direction (Smallest since '51 in FY 75\$-Outlay)

1. Many alternative needs

2. Utility of use of military force has declined

Example of Vietnam

Nuclear inhibitions

3. Acceptability of use of force has declined

At least for western democracies subject pressures of public opinion.

Communication explosion

Moral revulsion toward use of force

Public awareness of issues may lead to use

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4. Detente

Has been interpreted as reducing need for force

B. Need to ask three questions.

1. Why military force under these circumstances?

2. Will possession of that force lead to its use?

3. What military force?

II. Why need military force?

- A. Little debate need strategic deterrence

How much and what - debatable

- B. Little debate need to defend US

Where need to start defending -

Shore line -

Overseas -

1. Some W. Europe only
  2. Some W. Europe and Israel
  3. Some - more but not precise
  4. Real issue is how far offshore to U.S. vital interest extend?
  5. I submit - Fortress America absurd and propose a fundamental axiom: Must have a plainly evident capability to defend our national interests by military force, if necessary, wherever they lie.
- D. Does not mean this is our first resort. In fact emphasis is on plainly evident or perceived because what we want is the deterrent impact of force.

1. Perceptions

Soviet perceptions of us

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Our perceptions of Soviets

Perceptions of other nations of each of us individually  
and of balance of force between us

2. 1st Concern -

Soviets not perceive an imbalance that would be a temptation to:

- (1) apply pressure/leverage
- (2) employ force

3. Next concern is U.S. public perception -

Not impressed we are at such a disadvantage as to be

"better red than dead"

Or loss of that national pride and leadership on which free world dependent. No matter what say about our declining capabilities to assume burdens of world -

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power that supports the dignity and rights of individual man.

4. Another concern and a growing one is what "other nations" perceive despite pressure to retrench, reduce commitments, not be world's policeman, our national interests are extending further from our shoreline, not receding.

E. Why do I say this?

1. Combined W. Europe economy and Japanese economy becoming formidable GNP's

U.S. 1,200 B

ECC over \$600 B

Japan almost \$300 B

add either to Russia's \$500 B and you can see we cannot afford

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to let either slip into Soviet orbit

2. U.S. reliance on import of raw materials is increasing

\* U.S. imports over 90% of rubber, manganese, cobalt graphite, and chromium

Oil

\* U.S. imports some of 69 of 71 critical materials; USSR imports only 2 of same 71 (tin & rubber)

Related to import requirements necessary for foreign trade to BOP

3. Increasing importance of exploiting resources of seas that will involve us in more overseas interests

Not just coastal jurisdiction issue

e.g. Soviet fishing fleet off New England

Control of a few nations over vital waterways -

e.g. Malaysia - Indonesia

Egypt

Spain

4. Increasing not diminishing, proclivity to use of force by nations just below major power level.

e.g. Israel - Egypt

Iraq - Iran

Pak - India

N.VN - S.VN

Insurgency such as Cambodia - feeding on N.VN success

Danger of dragging in major powers

5. One of international danger spots is potential of growing economic disparity of LDC's and DC's as genesis of world strife.

This expansion of national interests to overseas areas does not mean a

greater likelihood of our intervening with force -

Does mean must consider what impact the perceptions of these nations of power balance between U.S. and Soviets is.

Impact on their political decisions

- F. Brings back to detente. Some who say detente indicates Soviets do not/will not take advantage anyway?

Risky matter -

1. No sign of decreasing size or emphasis on Soviet military forces:

In last 6 Years:

1. Introduced 6 new classes of submarines.

2. Introduced 10 new classes of major surface combatants.

Surface:

1. SS-N-3 on KYNDA and KRESTA cruisers, with 400 NM range, outrange all Western anti-ship weapons except aircraft.
2. DDG's plus CG's increased 35% in last year.

Sub:

1. 110 SSN (80 armed with cruise or ballistic missiles)
2. Even more important - when look at detente from Soviet view not just ours - See that Soviets view detente as continued competition - albeit shifting to non-military, but not a cessation of competition as we would like to view it.

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We dare not tempt them by being weak to revert to military competition. Especially since cannot anticipate a volte face, outright rejection of detente from a closed society.

Mutually negotiated reductions fine -

Otherwise - military balance essential to developing detente - trust. Why budget stays up - barely staying up to pre-VN levels. Lowest in purchasing power since 1951.

III. Will existence of force prompt its use?

Certainly can.

At same time, lack of preparedness certainly has/can lead to aggression - e.g. Korea, World War II

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What alternatives?

1. Disarm more rapidly than Soviets -

Risk upsetting detente

Risk national interests

2. Exercise firm civilian control so having force not father to using it.

Do not turn into a eunuch to avoid pregnancy

#### IV. What force?

##### A. Strategic Forces

1. Deter Soviets - perception
2. Impress others

Our rhetoric important

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Need to advertise our capabilities to Soviets

Way we make public comparisons shapes attitudes,  
criteria of "other nations"

##### B. Conventional Forces

Visible

Credible to those who know whose peacetime  
presence will help deter

Commitment forces - hostage forces

Europe

Demonstration forces

Display interest/intent

Especially Navy-Marine forces

Especially sea control forces - essential to  
any credible threat/support

Contingency forces

Navy-Marine spearhead

Secure air/beach heads

Cutting edge only

Army/Air Force

Rapid closure forces

Sustained combat forces

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## V. Conclusion

Must separate willingness to commit force from necessity for  
maintenance of forces.

Not mutually exclusive

Imbalance/impotence could force commitment against will

Similarly must separate desire for detente from necessity for  
maintenance of forces

Imbalance/impotence could kill incentive for detente

Must continually rethink

Applicable types of force

Applicable types of policies and tactics  
But against background of balance w/Soviets

World is bi-polar in military sense